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A FUTILE ENDEAVOR: DEFINING 
“SCANDALOUS” IN THE BANKRUPTCY 
CODE 
BRADLEY SIMON† 
“I shall not today attempt . . . to define [scandalous] . . . . But I 
know it when I see it.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Debtors often seek the special protections offered in 
bankruptcy due to the detrimental impacts of potentially 
scandalous matters, which are often outside the debtor’s control.  
Some file for bankruptcy after being accused of tortious or 
criminal conduct,2 while others may file their bankruptcy 
petitions after losing their jobs for allegedly scandalous reasons.3  
 
† Senior Staff, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., magna cum laude, 2016, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.A., 2011, University of Delaware. Special thanks to Vice 
Dean Emeritus Andrew J. Simons for his invaluable guidance on this Note and 
throughout all of law school. Further, I would like to acknowledge and thank 
Professor Keith Sharfman for his assistance and insight on the topics of bankruptcy 
and statutory interpretation. Lastly, but most importantly, I would like to thank my 
mother and father, Barry and Donna Simon, and my brother, Donald Simon. You 
have provided me with love, care, and the greatest support system a young man 
could ever ask for. Attempting to explain how much I love you and how grateful I am 
for everything you have given me would truly be a futile endeavor. 
1 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (referring 
to obscenity, the counsin of scandalous). 
2 See In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 2011) (filing 
of the bankruptcy petition came after Archdiocese became “the subject of multiple 
lawsuits seeking millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages for 
sexual abuse of children by specific clergy members”); Gitto v. Worcester Telegram & 
Gazette Corp. (In re Gitto Glob. Corp.), 422 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2005) (filing for 
corporate bankruptcy “amid allegations of financial distress and accounting 
irregularities”); In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675, 677 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) 
(filing of the company’s bankruptcy petition came shortly after former president was 
“convicted and sentenced on 109 separate criminal counts involving his activities as 
president of the Debtor entities”). But see SYDNEY RUTBERG, TEN CENTS ON THE 
DOLLAR: THE BANKRUPTCY GAME 151 (1973) (hypothesizing that the majority of 
“individual bankruptcies arise from shopping sprees at Bloomingdale’s or similar 
abuses of easy credit,” but providing no support for this blanket assertion). 
3 Neal v. Kan. City Star (In re Neal), 461 F.3d 1048, 1050–51 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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Struggling parents may file for bankruptcy to halt embarrassing 
foreclosure proceedings.4  Regardless of the circumstances, 
debtors frequently file to avail themselves of the automatic stay, 
a powerful tool only available in bankruptcy, which ceases 
collection efforts and most pending state and federal litigation.5  
As a result, many nonbankruptcy related “scandalous” issues 
find their way into the confines of bankruptcy court.6 
The common law,7 the First Amendment,8 and United States 
Supreme Court precedent9 all presage a broad presumption in 
favor of transparency of public records and judicial records.  The 
United States Congress adopted 11 U.S.C. § 107 of the 
Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) to guide bankruptcy courts in 
analyzing this right-to-access,10 which predates the United States 
Constitution itself.11  Section 107 codifies the common law and 




4 See, e.g., In re Nicfur-Cruz Realty Corp., 50 B.R. 162, 168 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 
1985) (filing bankruptcy petition “to halt the continuation of a foreclosure action”); 
Coletta v. Rubber2Gold, Inc. (In re Coletta), No. 05-88753-ast., 2011 WL 501825, at 
*13 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011) (using bankruptcy petition to “temporarily halt 
the sale” of real property). 
5 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). However, some matters are exempt from the 
automatic stay. See id. § 362(b). 
6 For example, in In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, tort claimants filed 
allegations of sexual abuse in bankruptcy court. 661 F.3d at 421–22. Moreover, in In 
re Phar-Mor, Inc., complaints were filed in bankruptcy court for “several strategic 
reasons which would not be apparent, on its face, to a reasonable lay person: a need 
to preserve some cause of action or be barred by a statute of limitations.” 191 B.R. at 
679–80. 
7 See, e.g., In re Caswell, 29 A. 259, 259 (R.I. 1893); State ex rel. Colescott v. 
King, 57 N.E. 535, 537 (Ind. 1900); State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 334 
(N.J. 1879). 
8 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980); 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982); Press-Enter. Co. 
v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. I), 464 U.S. 501, 509–10 (1984). 
9 See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); Gannett 
Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 389 (1979); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 
U.S. 20, 33 (1984). 
10 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (2012). 
11 United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981) (determining that 
the right to access court records “antedates the Constitution”). 
12 In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (“Section 107 
codified the Supreme Court’s Nixon decision in the bankruptcy setting by 
recognizing the common-law right of public access, subject to the limited exceptions 
of confidential commercial information and scandalous or defamatory material.”); see 
also In re Nunn, 49 B.R. 963, 964 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985). 
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numerous courts differ widely on how to interpret § 107(b)(2), 
which states that “scandalous” or “defamatory” matters should 
not be publicly available.13 
Interpretive approaches to § 107 are a matter of great 
debate, as courts lack a uniformed approach.  Even more 
challenging is the fact that Congress requires courts to give 
objective meaning to subjective terminology, such as the term 
scandalous.14  Scandals, much like beauty, often depend on the 
beholder, as scandals are often fact specific.  The parties involved 
and the surrounding circumstances are crucial to any analysis of 
“scandalous matters.”  For example, allegations that a United 
States President engaged in an adulterous relationship with a 
young intern would surely qualify as scandalous.  Yet these same 
allegations may not be scandalous to someone in the 
entertainment industry.  Many courts have defined the word 
scandalous differently; some have defined it broadly15 and some 
narrowly,16 while some have conflated scandalous with 
“defamatory,” which implies falsity.17  The allegations of an 
adulterous President would constitute as scandalous regardless 
of truthfulness.  Similarly, allegations that a law firm’s partner 
engaged in an adulterous affair with a junior associate are 
certainly scandalous, but hardly defamatory—if true.18 
This Note addresses the various, sometimes contradictory, 
approaches courts have taken in interpreting what constitutes 
scandalous material under § 107(b)(2) of the Code.  Part I traces 
the right of public access to documents and records in bankruptcy 
courts to its common-law and First Amendment origins and 
 
13 11 U.S.C.A. § 107(b)(2). 
14 See Helen Silving, A Plea for a Law of Interpretation, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 
504 (1950). 
15 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d 417, 432 (9th Cir. 2011) (defining 
scandalous matters as those which are “disgraceful, offensive, shameful and the 
like”). 
16 Gitto v. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. (In re Gitto Glob. Corp.), 422 
F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005) (defining scandalous matters to be those which are 
“untrue, or . . . potentially untrue and irrelevant or included within a bankruptcy 
filing for an improper end”); Anthracite Capital, Inc. v. Bank of Am. (In re 
Anthracite Capital, Inc.), 492 B.R. 162, 174–75 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (requiring 
scandalous matters to be “grossly offensive, irrelevant to the proceeding, and 
submitted for an improper use”). 
17 Gitto, 422 F.3d at 14. 
18 Isabel Vincent & Melissa Klein, Affair and Vengeful Wife Rips Apart 9/11 
Law Firm, N.Y. POST, (Nov. 9, 2014, 5:05 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/11/09/affair-
and-vengeful-wife-rips-apart-911-law-firm. 
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discusses why transparency is particularly important in the 
bankruptcy context.  Part II addresses the split of authority 
among the circuit courts regarding the appropriate way to define 
scandalous, focusing on the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit’s “truthfulness and relevance” approach,19 the 
Eighth Circuit’s “context-sensitive” approach,20 and the Ninth 
Circuit’s “plain-meaning” approach.21  Part III explores the pros 
and cons of these approaches and formulates a new rule to 
resolve this interpretive split.  This rule fuses the context-
sensitive and plain-meaning approaches to create a hybrid rule 
where courts first look at the purpose of a filed document before 
analyzing whether it is “disgraceful, offensive, shameful and the 
like.”22  Under this approach, commonly filed papers are less 
likely to be sealed under § 107(b)(2) while rare, strategic filings 
are more likely to be withheld from the public. 
I. THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE RIGHT TO VIEW AND 
INSPECT COURT RECORDS 
A. The Common Law 
Common-law courts in this country have long recognized a 
“strong presumption in favor of public access to judicial 
records.”23  This presumption extended to many public records as 
well, including titles to land and documents recorded in public 
offices.24  However, persons requesting to inspect records had to 
show a real interest in the document.25  Mere curiosity was 
generally insufficient.26 
 
19 Gitto, 422 F.3d at 14. 
20 Neal v. Kan. City Star (In re Neal), 461 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 2006). 
21 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d 417, 432 (9th Cir. 2011). 
22 Id. 
23 Robbins v. Tripp, 510 B.R. 61, 65 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014). 
24 State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 57 N.E. 535, 538 (Ind. 1900). 
25 Id. at 537 (“The general rule which obtained at common law was that every 
person was entitled to an inspection of public records . . . provided he had an interest 
in the matters to which such records related.”); State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41 
N.J.L. 332, 336 (N.J. 1879) (permitting persons to inspect police misconduct reports 
when the “documents will furnish competent evidence or necessary information”); C 
v. C., 320 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1974) (holding that “member[s] of the public ha[ve] a 
right to access judicial records . . . if [they have] an interest therein for some useful 
purpose”). 
26 C., 320 A.2d at 723. 
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Not all judicial records were publicly available at common 
law,27 as courts refused to make documents accessible for 
improper purposes,28 such as “to gratify private spite or promote 
public scandal.”29  In determining whether to limit a document’s 
availability, common-law courts examined and balanced various 
and competing factors, such as the harm that would occur by 
making a document available against the public’s interest in the 
document.30  This common-law public availability right did not 
extend to certain documents, such as “[d]ocumentary evidence in 
the hands of a district attorney, minutes of a grand jury, [and] 
evidence in a divorce action.”31 
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court addressed the 
common-law right to access court materials in Nixon v. Warner 
Communications, Inc.32  In Nixon, members of the media sought 
access to taped recordings that were used in the “Watergate” 
criminal prosecution of Richard Nixon, the former President of 
the United States.33  However, based on the circumstances 
surrounding the case, the Court held that “the common-law right 
of access to judicial records” did not extend to the tapes in 
question.34 
The Nixon court held that “courts of this country recognize a 
general right to inspect and copy . . . judicial records and 
documents,”35 and that “[e]very court has supervisory power over 
its own records and files.” 36  The Supreme Court followed this 
common-law right fairly closely, holding that the public-
availability presumption “is not absolute.”37  The Court 
referenced multiple examples of when access to court records 
may be denied, such as when documents are filed for “improper 
 
27 State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 137 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Wis. 1966) (“[T]he 
right to inspect public documents and records at common law is not absolute.”). 
28 In re Caswell, 29 A. 259, 259 (R.I. 1893) (“The judicial records of the state 
should always be accessible to the people for all proper purposes.”). 
29 Id. (denying access to court records because publishing “the painful, and 
sometimes disgusting, details of a divorce case . . . fails to serve any useful 
purpose . . . [and leads to] demoralization and corruption . . . by catering to a morbid 
craving for that which is sensational and impure”). 
30 Owens, 137 N.W.2d at 474. 
31 Id. 
32 435 U.S. 589, 607 (1978). 
33 Id. at 589. 
34 Id. at 608. 
35 Id. at 597. 
36 Id. at 598. 
37 Id. 
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purposes” and to expose confidential business data.38  Shortly 
after Nixon, the Supreme Court added that courts maintain 
“equitable powers . . . over their own processes, to prevent 
abuses, oppression, and injustices,”39 which is consistent with the 
ideals of the common law.40 
B. The First Amendment Right to Know About the 
Administration of Justice 
The right to view court records is “rooted in the public’s First 
Amendment right to know about the administration of justice.”41  
The Supreme Court acknowledges a First Amendment 
presumption favoring transparency in criminal trials,42 while 
other courts hold that “the constitutional right of access applies 
to civil as well as criminal trials.”43  Much like the common law, 
the constitutional right to inspect court records is not without 
limitation.44  To determine whether a certain type of proceeding 
should be made open to the public, the Supreme Court evaluates 
two separate issues.  First, the Court evaluates whether the 
proceeding has traditionally been open to the public.45  Next, the 
Court inquires whether public access would promote the 
 
38 Id. 
39 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 (1984) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 144 (1888)). 
40 See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598; Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., 40 N.W. 731, 734–
35 (Mich. 1888); In re Caswell, 29 A. 259, 259 (R.I. 1893) (finding that judicial 
records should not be made available “to gratify private spite or promote public 
scandal”). 
41 Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pictures 
Corp.), 21 F.3d 24, 26 (2d. Cir 1994). 
42 William T. Bodoh & Michelle M. Morgan, Protective Orders in the Bankruptcy 
Court: The Congressional Mandate of Bankruptcy Code Section 107 and Its 
Constitutional Implications, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 67, 70 (1996); see also 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (plurality opinion) 
(“[A] presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under 
our system of justice.”). 
43 NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 358 (Cal. 
1999). See also Associated Press v. District Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 
1983) (“the public and press have a first amendment right of access to pretrial 
documents.”); Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, at 73 (“[T]he First Amendment 
presumption of public access [extends] to criminal records, civil trials, and civil 
records.”). 
44 Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, at 71. 
45 See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. I), 464 U.S. 501, 510 
(1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982). 
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democratic process.46  Thus, proceedings are generally made open 
to the public when they have been historically publicly accessible 
and when accessibility benefits and furthers the democratic 
system.  Further, accessibility to documents or to proceedings 
may be denied based on “a defendant’s right to a fair trial, the 
protection of privileged information, and privacy interests of the 
parties.”47  However, nondisclosure is not generally granted, as 
courts must find “the denial [of public access] is necessitated by a 
compelling governmental interest, and [the remedy must be] 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”48 
It is important to have transparency in the courts because 
such transparency attempts to maintain the public’s confidence 
in the administration of justice.49  Granting persons the ability to 
inspect records upholds “the integrity, quality, and respect in our 
judicial system,”50 as transparency in the courts “is an essential 
feature of democratic control.”51  Broad access to court records 
assures “judges perform their duties in an honest and informed 
manner.”52  After all, the judiciary is merely one branch of a 
government established “by the people, and answerable to the 
people,”53 and making records available allows society “to keep a 
watchful eye on the workings of public agencies.”54  Limiting or 





46 Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1985); 
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604. 
47 Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, at 72 (footnotes omitted). 
48 Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607. When the Supreme Court evaluates 
“cases under the First Amendment presumption of public access, the standard of 
review . . . is one of strict scrutiny.” Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, at 71. 
49 Allowing public access “is based on the need for federal courts . . . to have a 
measure of accountability and for the public to have confidence in the administration 
of justice.” Geltzer v. Andersen Worldwide, S.C., No. 05 Civ. 3339(GEL), 2007 WL 
273526, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2007) (alteration in original). 
50 Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Orion Picutres Corp. (In re Orion Pictures 
Corp.), 21 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting In re Analytical Sys., Inc., 83 B.R. 833, 
835 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987)). 
51 Anthracite Capital, Inc. v. Deutsche Bank AG (In re Anthracite Capital, Inc.), 
492 B.R. 162, 171 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
52 Seymour Moskowitz, Discovering Discovery: Non-Party Access to Pretrial 
Information in the Federal Courts 1938–2006, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 817, 820 (2007). 
53 Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, at 68. 
54 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). 
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measure, and nondisclosure should be “the exception rather than 
the rule,”55 especially because keeping records private imposes 
great costs to the judiciary system.56 
C. The Importance of Transparency in Bankruptcy 
Maintaining transparency is especially important in 
bankruptcy court.  Rather than forcing delinquent debtors into 
slavery57 or prison,58 bankruptcy offers families and corporations 
the opportunity to obtain a fresh financial start either by 
reorganizing debts over a set period of time59 or by liquidating 
nonexempt assets and property in return for a discharge of 
certain debts.60 
Extending this common-law and constitutional right to make 
records available in bankruptcy “fosters confidence among 
creditors regarding the fairness of the bankruptcy system.”61  
 
55 Hope ex rel. Clark v. Pearson, 38 B.R. 423, 425 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984); see 
Anthracite Capital, Inc., 492 B.R. at 171 (stating that nondisclosure is “an 
extraordinary measure that is warranted only under rare circumstances”). 
56 City of Hartford v. Chase, 942 F.2d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 1991) (Pratt, J., 
concurring) (limiting public access “entails great costs” because courts must use 
valuable resources to keep files private). 
57 See, e.g., Becky A. Vogt, State v. Allison: Imprisonment for Debt in South 
Dakota, 46 S.D. L. REV. 334, 334–35 (2001) (explaining that creditors in England 
who secured judgments against debtors could have the debtor “sold into slavery”); 
John B. Mitchell & Kelly Kunsch, Of Driver’s Licenses and Debtor’s Prison, 4 
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 439, 445 (2005) (tracing the history of debtor slavery to early 
Rome and to American colonies). 
58 See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, 
and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 8 (1986) (explaining 
that English creditors would commonly force debtors into prisons if they could not 
pay their debts); Richard E. James, Putting Fear Back Into the Law and Debtors 
Back Into Prison: Reforming the Debtors’ Prison System, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 143, 145 
(2002) (tracing debtor’s prisons’ existence back to the fifth century B.C.E.); see also 
CHARLES DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD 120–22 (Project Gutenberg) (describing the 
horrors of debtor’s prisons). 
59 Consumer reorganization plans may not exceed “3 years, unless the court, for 
cause, approves a longer period, but the court may not approve a period that is 
longer than 5 years.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d)(2) (2012). 
60 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2012) (discharging individual debts following 
liquidation); id. § 944(b) (discharging debts of municipalities in bankruptcy); 
id. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (discharging debts following a Chapter 11 plan). However, not all 
debts are dischargeable in bankruptcy. For example, debts incurred from fraudulent 
acts or by breach of fiduciary duties are exempt from being discharged. Id. § 523. 
61 Gitto v. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. (In re Gitto Glob. Corp.), 422 
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005). Trials and hearings in adversarial proceedings commenced 
in bankruptcy court must be conducted in an open court. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(b). 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a), which is made applicable by Federal Rule of 
FINAL_SIMON 10/12/2016  9:02 AM 
2016]  “SCANDALOUS” IN THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 533 
Debtors in bankruptcy can access extraordinary remedies not 
otherwise available in state courts, such as the ability to reject 
detrimental contracts.62  At the moment a bankruptcy petition is 
filed, debtors are also shielded by the automatic stay, which 
ceases collection efforts and most litigation.63  To maintain 
accountability, it is especially important that bankruptcy records 
be publicly obtainable. 
Section 107(b) was created to maintain the status quo of a 
debtor’s bankruptcy estate, as the dissemination of “defamatory” 
or “scandalous” information could harm the estate’s value.64  
Detrimental effects of such dissemination could lead to job loss or 
business regression, impairing what creditors could collect from 
the debtor.65 
D. The Supreme Court, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, and 
§ 107 
In November 1978, just seven months after the Nixon 
decision, Congress codified and expanded on the right to view 
judicial records in 11 U.S.C. § 107 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 1978.66  Adopting § 107 indicated Congress’s “strong desire to 
preserve the public’s right of access to judicial records in 
bankruptcy proceedings.”67  One notable scholar has stated that 
“it is possible to conclude that [§] 107 was intended to 
complement and implement the Nixon decision,” since the 
statute’s enactment came shortly after the Nixon decision.68  
Section 107(a) states, in pertinent part, that all papers “filed in [a 
bankruptcy case] and the dockets of a bankruptcy court are 
 
Bankruptcy Procedure 9017, states that a witness’ “testimony must be taken in open 
court unless” otherwise provided. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a); see FED R. BANKR. P. 9017. 
62 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012) (stating that a trustee or a debtor-in-possession 
“may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor”). 
63 Id. 
64 David I. Cisar & Christopher J. Stroebel, A Private Moment in the Fishbowl: 
Filings Under Seal in Bankruptcy Court, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J 38, 38 (2012). 
65 In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675, 680 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (limiting 
public access to maintain interested party’s “positive reputation in the local business 
community”). 
66 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (2012). 
67 Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pictures 
Corp.), 31 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1994). 
68 Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, at 77; see also Keith Sharfman, Derivative 
Suits in Bankruptcy, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 11 (2004) (arguing that pre-Code 
holdings and procedure indicate congressional intent). 
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public records and open to examination by an entity at 
reasonable times without charge.”69  The exceptions to § 107(a) 
are listed in § 107(b).70  The first exception provides that “trade 
secret[s] or confidential research, development, or commercial 
information” is nonaccessible.71  The second exception states that 
nondisclosure of a document filed in bankruptcy is appropriate to 
“protect a person with respect to scandalous or defamatory 
matter.”72  The Code does not define the term scandalous. 
There are several differences between § 107 and the 
common-law right to inspect judicial records.  Common-law 
courts only made “judicial records” available to the public,73 while 
§ 107(a) covers “all papers filed in a [bankruptcy] case.”74  Courts 
have applied § 107 to many types of documents, including 
discovery documents,75 creditor lists,76 investigative reports,77 and 
court-ordered memoranda.78  After determining a document was 
a “judicial record,” common-law courts would “balance[] the 
 
69 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (2012). 
70 Id. § 107(b). 
71 Id. § 107(b)(1). 
72 Id. § 107(b)(2). 
73 Gitto v. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. (In re Gitto Glob. Corp.), 422 
F.3d 1, 9–10 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Boston Herald, Inc., 321 F.3d 174, 180 
(1st Cir. 2003) (“Not all documents filed with a court are considered ‘judicial 
documents.’ ” (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1255 (10th Cir. 
1988)); In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d 417, 430 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he 
common-law rule distinguishes between dispositive and non-dispositive motions, 
while § 107 covers all papers filed in a bankruptcy case.”); see Stone v. Univ. of Md. 
Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that the First 
Amendment right to inspect documents “has been extended only to particular 
judicial records and documents”). 
74 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 317 (1977). Section 107 (a) covers all papers filed in 
the bankruptcy docket, and “the term ‘ “docket” includes the claims docket, the 
proceedings docket, and all papers filed in a case.’ ” Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, 
at 81–82 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 317–18 (1977)); see Gitto, 422 F.3d at 9–
10 (“[Section 107 does away] with the [common law] need to determine whether the 
document at issue is a ‘judicial record’ by clarifying that, in the bankruptcy context, 
the presumption of public access applies to any paper filed in a bankruptcy case, not 
only to the narrower category of papers that would be considered judicial records 
under the common law.”). But see Alec Ostrow, My Lips Are Sealed: Sealing Files, 
Closing Courtrooms and in Camera Inspections in Bankruptcy Cases, in ANNUAL 
SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 203, 206 (2004 ed.) (“[T]hings that are filed that are 
not ‘paper[s],’ such as an audio or video recording of a hearing . . . are not statutorily 
required to be publicly available.”). 
75 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 424. 
76 Neal v. Kan. City Star (In re Neal), 461 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 2006). 
77 Gitto, 422 F.3d at 5. 
78 Robbins v. Tripp, 510 B.R. 61, 64 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014). 
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public interest in the information against privacy interests.”79  
Section 107 does not require bankruptcy courts to balance such 
factors.80  Rather, when one of the § 107(b) exceptions is met, 
protection must be offered.81  Further, common-law courts had 
discretion to formulate exceptions to the general rule of 
disclosing court documents.82  Bankruptcy courts, however, do 
not have such broad discretion, as § 107(b) has only a few, 
specific exceptions.83  Because § 107 addresses and resolves a 
problem formerly dealt with at common law, the statute 
“supplants the common law for purposes of determining public 
access to papers filed in a bankruptcy case.”84  Statutes abrogate 
common-law doctrines when the statute addresses and resolves 
the same issue that the common law dealt with.  Therefore, 
“issues concerning public disclosure of documents in bankruptcy 
cases should be resolved under § 107.”85 
II. A SPLIT OF AUTHORITY: THE VARIOUS APPROACHES TO 
INTERPRETING § 107 
A. The First Circuit’s “Truthfulness and Relevance” Approach 
A document’s truthfulness and relevance plays a major role 
for courts analyzing § 107(b)(2) under the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit’s jurisdiction.  To qualify as a 
 
79 United States v. Connolly, 321 F.3d 174, 190 (1st Cir. 2003). 
80 Gitto, 422 F.3d at 10. Bankruptcy courts analyzing public-access issues under 
§ 107(b)(2) “need not balance the equities of [a] case, as Congress has already 
performed that task.” Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, at 85. Additionally, “[t]he 
mandatory language of § 107(b) negates the need for [common-law or First 
Amendment balancing].” In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1995). 
81 When one of the § 107(b) exceptions are satisfied, a court must “protect a 
requesting interested party and has no discretion to deny” such motions. Video 
Software Dealers Ass’n v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.), 21 F.3d 
24, 27 (2d Cir. 1994). 
82 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d 417, 430 (9th Cir. 2011); Cisar & 
Stroebel, supra note 64, at 38 (explaining that “courts have held that the exceptions 
[to § 107(a)] are few and are narrowly construed” because of the importance of 
transparency in bankruptcy). 
83 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 430. 
84 Gitto, 422 F.3d at 8; In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F. 3d at 430 
(“[Section] 107 displaces the common law right of access in the bankruptcy 
context.”). It is also worth noting that statutes abrogate common-law principles 
when “the statute . . . ‘speak[s] directly’ to the question addressed by the common 
law.” United States v. Tex., 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993). 
85 In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995). 
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§ 107(b)(2) exception, a paper must be completely false, possibly 
false and irrelevant, or filed for an improper purpose.86  This 
approach narrows scandalous matters significantly, as a showing 
of truthfulness eliminates material from the protections of 
§ 107(b)(2). 
In Gitto v. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp., the First 
Circuit confronted § 107(b)(2) after a corporation filed for 
bankruptcy “amid allegations of financial distress and accounting 
irregularities.”87  The bankruptcy court appointed an examiner to 
investigate and prepare a report regarding “the existence of any 
prepetition fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, 
mismanagement, or irregularity in the management and 
business affairs of the Debtor.”88  A part owner and the chairman 
of the corporation motioned to make the investigative report 
publicly unavailable for containing “scandalous and defamatory 
material within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(2).”89  
Members of the media opposed the motions to inhibit the report’s 
availability.90 
The First Circuit held that material is only worthy of “the 
protections of § 107(b)(2) based on a showing that either (1) the 
material is untrue, or (2) the material is potentially untrue and 
irrelevant or included within a bankruptcy filing for an improper 
end.”91  The court believed such an approach would make 
nondisclosure “the exception rather than the rule.”92  In 
formulating this rule, the First Circuit compared § 107(b)(2) with 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), reasoning that the two 
rules “share a common premise.”93  Like § 107(b)(2), Rule 12(f) 
allows federal courts to “strike from a pleading . . . scandalous 
matter.”94  Thus, both § 107(b)(2) and Rule 12(f) protect persons 
and corporations from “scandalous or defamatory material 
submitted under the guise of a properly pleaded [complaint].”95 
 





91 Id. at 14. 
92 Id. at 9 (quoting Hope ex rel. Clark v. Pearson, 38 B.R. 423, 425 (Bankr. M.D. 
Ga. 1984)). 
93 Id. at 12. 
94 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). 
95 Gitto, 422 F.3d at 12 (quoting In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675, 679 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio 1995)). 
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The motions to limit the availability of the investigative 
report were denied by the First Circuit.96  Though the report 
contained potentially untrue matters, the First Circuit found 
these matters to be relevant to the underlying bankruptcy 
proceeding.97  Further support for denying the motion was found 
in § 1104(c) of the Code, which allows bankruptcy courts to 
investigate “allegations of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, 
misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in the” debtor’s 
business.98  The First Circuit further held that harm to the 
corporation’s reputation is insufficient to be protected by 
§ 107(b)(2).99 
B. The “Context-Sensitive” Approach 
The Eighth Circuit’s approach to § 107(b)(2) focuses 
primarily on the reason the allegedly scandalous document was 
filed.  This approach allows courts to employ common sense when 
determining if documents should be withheld from the public by 
looking into why it appears in the bankruptcy dockets.100  Other 
courts have employed a similar approach, holding that the 
purpose a paper was filed “should inform the inquiry into 
whether that material falls within the § 107(b)(2) exception.”101 
The Eighth Circuit employed this “context-sensitive” 
approach after former municipal judge Deborah Neal filed for 
bankruptcy.102  Neal’s life began to fall apart after she was found 
in the early hours of morning gambling at a casino.103  She would 
later lose her job and be brought up on federal criminal charges 
after authorities learned she received loans from attorneys.104  In 







96 Id. at 16. 
97 Id. at 16–17. 
98 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2012). 
99 Gitto, 422 F.3d at 16. 
100 Neal v. Kan. City Star (In re Neal), 461 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 2006). 
101 Gitto, 422 F.3d at 13. 
102 Neal, 461 F.3d at 1050–51. 
103 Id. at 1050. 
104 Id. at 1051. 
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required to submit a creditor list—a list of all parties she owed 
money to.105  The names of many practicing attorneys appeared 
on that list.106 
Neal and the attorneys named on the creditor list moved to 
have the list be made inaccessible to the public, and a local 
newspaper opposed the motion.107  The bankruptcy court granted 
Neal’s motion, but the district court overruled the bankruptcy 
court and held that “there is nothing ‘scandalous’ about the 
[creditor list].”108  Neal and the attoney-creditors appealed. 
In ruling that the creditor list was not scandalous, and thus 
not deserving of protection, the Eighth Circuit evaluated the 
primary purpose the creditor list appeared in the bankruptcy 
docket.109  The creditor list was ultimately made available 
because its “filing had a valid purpose.”110  Submitting a creditor 
list is a mandatory step debtors must abide by to receive the 
“bankruptcy discharge.”111  The creditor list did not contain any 
additional “information other than [that] required by law,” and 
the list would only become potentially scandalous with 
knowledge of the identities of the creditors and the debtor.112  
Although the creditor list could impair the reputations of the 
attorney-creditors, the Eighth Circuit did not believe it rose to 
the level of being “[a] reservoir[] of libelous statements for press 
consumption.”113 
 
105 Id. at 1051. A creditors list is “a list of person or entities to whom [the debtor] 
owes money.” Id. at 1054. 
106 Id. at 1051 (“[Neal] maintained that she did not give favorable rulings in 
exchange for loans. However . . . the Assistant United States Attorney . . . mentioned 
that Neal may have provided favorable treatment to some of the attorney’s who 
made loans to her.”). For example, a defense attorney that appeared on the creditor 
list had traffic citations dismissed by the debtor-judge. Neal, 461 F.3d at 1051. A 
different attorney obtained a “favorable ruling” after loaning the debtor thousands of 
dollars. Id. at 1051 n.2. 
107 Id. at 1050. 
108 Id. at 1051. 
109 Id. at 1054. 
110 Cisar & Stroebel, supra note 64, at 71. 
111 Neal, 461 F.3d at 1054. 
112 Id. Both the debtor and creditors agreed that neither the document itself nor 
its material contents were scandalous. Id. 
113 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting In re 
Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995)). 
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C. The Ninth Circuit’s “Plain-Meaning” Approach 
Unlike the First and Eighth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit 
employs a “strict textual approach,” which gives bankruptcy 
judges discretion to limit the availability of court papers.114  The 
Ninth Circuit does not analyze why a paper was filed, its 
truthfulness, or relevance when deciding whether it is to be 
protected by § 107(b)(2).  Rather, papers may be sealed when 
they are “disgraceful, offensive, shameful and the like.”115 
In 2004, the Portland Archdiocese (the “Archdiocese”) filed 
for bankruptcy while facing numerous allegations of clergy 
members sexually abusing children.116  Upon filing for 
bankruptcy, the litigation being conducted ceased pursuant to 
the automatic stay, and the bankruptcy docket became “the 
forum for . . . the tort claims.”117  Various personnel files of clergy 
members were produced during discovery, even though many of 
those clergymen had never been charged with sexual abuse.118  
After the bankruptcy case was complete, the tort claimants 
wished to release the documents containing the names of the 
clergy members.119  The Archdiocese and various priests objected 
to this request, claiming that § 107(b)(2) of the Code “precluded 
the release” of those documents.120  In rejecting the Archdiocese’s 
argument, the bankruptcy court did not believe the documents 
were filed in the bankruptcy case for an “improper purpose.”121  
Additionally, much like the First Circuit did in Gitto, the 
bankruptcy court analyzed whether the documents were relevant 
and “untrue” or “potentially untrue.”122  The district court 
affirmed the bankruptcy court’s interpretation, and two priests 
appealed.123 
 
114 Cisar & Stroebel, supra note 64, at 38. 
115 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d 417, 432 (9th Cir. 2011). 
116 Id. at 421. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. Various personnel files were produced because certain clergy members 
were mentioned in the John Jay Study, “a national study of clergy abuse 
commissioned by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.” Id. 
119 Id. at 422. 
120 Id. at 422–23. 
121 Id. at 423. 
122 Id. at 431. 
123 Id. at 423. Circuit courts review district court rulings originating from 
bankruptcy court de novo, meaning that circuit courts “do not give deference to the 
district court’s determinations.” Mantz v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization (In re 
Mantz), 343 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that “the public 
is permitted ‘access to litigation documents and information 
produced during discovery,’ ”124 but rejected the bankruptcy 
court’s analysis of § 107(b)(2).125  The Ninth Circuit began its 
analysis by examining the language of § 107(b)(2) and found it to 
be “unambiguous.”126  Therefore, it was not necessary to go 
beyond the plain meaning of the statue like the First and Eighth 
Circuits had previously done.  Because § 107(b)(2) does not define 
scandalous,127 and because § 107 lacks significant legislative 
history,128  the court turned to secondary sources to define the 
term.  After consulting with the dictionary definition of 
scandalous,129 the court concluded that matters qualify as 
scandalous when they are “disgraceful, offensive, shameful and 
the like.”130  Much like accusations of the President engaging in 
an extramarital affair, allegations of priests engaging in sexual 
relations with “children are most assuredly ‘scandalous’ because 
they bring discredit onto the alleged perpetrators,” regardless of 





124 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 424 (quoting Phillips v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
125 The Ninth Circuit traced the bankruptcy court’s interpretation to First and 
Eighth Circuit cases, but found neither approach persuasive. Id. at 431–32. 
126 Id. at 432; see Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (“When 
the words of a statute are unambiguous . . . ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’ ” (quoting 
Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981))). 
127 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 432. 
128 Section 107 contains hardly any legislative history, and the miniscule 
amount of legislative history that exists “does little more than parrot the language of 
the statute.” Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, at 76 n.47. “The legislative history of 
[§] 107 of the Bankruptcy Code provides little insight into its meaning.” Bodoh & 
Morgan, supra note 42, at 76; see Gitto v. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. (In re 
Gitto Glob. Corp.), 422 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[T]here is virtually no legislative 
history for § 107.”). Further, Congress failed to define scandalous in whatever 
existing legislative history that exists. In re Food Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 359 B.R. 543, 
555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
129 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 432 (“The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines ‘scandalous’ as, among other things, ‘bringing discredit on one’s 
class or position’ or ‘grossly disgraceful.’ ” (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 
575 (2d ed. 2001)). But see scandalous matter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014) (defining such information to be improper because “it is both grossly 
disgraceful (or defamatory) and irrelevant to an action or defense”). 
130 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 432. 
131 Id. at 433. 
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bankruptcy court erred in not granting [the clergy members’] 
motion” and ordered that the names of the clergymen be sealed 
pursuant to § 107(b)(2).132 
III. COMPARING AND CONTRASTING THE APPROACHES 
A. The Major Flaw With the First Circuit’s Approach 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s 
approach to § 107(b)(2), requiring courts to examine a matter’s 
truthfulness and relevancy, is misleading, overly broad, and 
unworkable.  Because the automatic stay halts the majority of 
litigation when the bankruptcy petition is filed,133 many 
potentially “scandalous” matters are filed for strategic purposes 
or out of necessity.134  Further, many documents containing 
possibly scandalous matters are mere allegations.  Therefore, a 
matter’s truthfulness or untruthfulness is irrelevant to qualify as 
scandalous. 
The First Circuit’s “truthfulness and relevance” approach 
will cripple judicial economy and efficiency while further 
burdening debtors.  Under the First Circuit’s approach, debtors 
would seemingly be forced to entertain a series of sub-trials to 
prove a matter or allegation untrue or potentially untrue and 
irrelevant to the underlying bankruptcy.  To entertain such 
matters would place a significant burden on the already heavy 
dockets of those courts.  Further, the “clear and unambiguous 
usage of ‘or’ ” in § 107(b) indicates Congress’s intent to have  
 
 
132 Id. However, the court only sealed the names of one of the two clergy 
members. The clergyman that received protection was, at the time, in his 
mideighties and had retired nearly twenty years earlier. Conversely, the clergyman 
whose identity was released to the public continued on as a clergyman, “where his 
clerical duties may bring him into contact with children.” Id. at 428. The court 
released his name because of the compelling and “weighty interest in public safety 
and in knowing who might sexually abuse children.” Id. at 428; see New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982) (holding that protecting the “physical and 
psychological well-being of a minor” is a compelling state interest). 
133 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). 
134 See, e.g., In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675, 678 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) 
(filing document in bankruptcy court to maintain a cause of action); Roye Zur, 
Preserving Estate Causes of Action for Post-Confirmation Litigation, 32 CAL. BANKR. 
J. 427, 427 (2013) (failing to assert causes of action that “could or should have been 
raised pre-confirmation . . . are forever barred as a result of plan confirmation”). 
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defamatory and scandalous matters treated differently.135  While 
truthfulness is a defense to defamatory allegations,136 false 
accusations may still be scandalous. 
The First Circuit’s holding is further erroneous as it is 
contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent.  A court’s 
duty, according to the Supreme Court, is “to read the statute 
according to the natural and obvious import of the language, 
without resorting to subtle and forced construction for the 
purpose of either limiting or extending its operation.”137  
Requiring a finding of truthfulness or relevancy to qualify as 
scandalous is a “forced construction” the Supreme Court 
explicitly prohibits.  Relevancy and truthfulness are 
inappropriate to analyze whether a matter is scandalous and any 
such anaylsis results in an unnecessary waste of judicial 
resources. 
B. The Benefits of the “Context-Sensitive” Approach 
Employing a context-sensitive approach is crucial to an 
analysis of § 107(b)(2), as commonly filed papers are often less 
deserving of protection.  Case law indicates that documents are 
worthy of protection when they are filed for rare and unusual 
purposes.138  However, when the document is one typically filed 
in bankruptcy court, it should be made available to the public. 
Many decisions lend support to a “context-sensitive” 
approach.  For example, in Robbins v. Tripp, a lawyer’s court-
ordered memorandum, which was to detail problems with his 
bankruptcy practice, was protected by § 107(b)(2) because it was 
not part of a traditional adversarial proceeding.139  The Robbins 
court held that the document was deserving of protection because 
 
135 Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pictures 
Corp.), 21 F.3d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that under § 107(b)(1), the placement of 
“or” between “trade secret” and “commercial information” indicates different 
requirements for the two terms). 
136 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977). 
137 United States v. Temple, 105 U.S. 97, 99 (1881); see also Conn. Nat’l Bank v. 
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (“When the words of a statute are unambiguous, 
then . . . ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’ ”(quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 
424, 430 (1981))). 
138 Robbins v. Tripp, 510 B.R. 61, 69 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014). 
139 Id. at 68. The court-ordered report included “details concerning how [the 
lawyer] supervised his staff . . . organized files . . . communicated with his 
clients . . . and [included] impressions of the US [Trustee] regarding [the lawyer’s] 
legal practice.” Id. at 64 n.1. 
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the court was acting “to ensure . . . that a member of its bar was 
performing at an appropriate level.”140  The report was filed for a 
rare, unusual purpose, and the court ordered the lawyer to write 
candidly and openly.141  Based on the extreme and unusual 
purposes surrounding the report, the court ordered the entire 
document be filed under seal.142  Conversely, the bankruptcy 
court in In re Creighton denied the debtor-teacher’s motion to 
redact her name from her bankruptcy documents, even though 
she was being teased and humiliated at work.143  Although public 
knowledge of the teacher’s bankruptcy filing was undeniably 
embarrassing, she reaped various benefits of the bankruptcy 
system, such as obtaining a discharge of certain debts.144  This is 
similar to Neal v. Kansas City Star, where the former-judge’s 
creditor list needed to be filed to facilitate her bankruptcy 
discharge.145 
C. The Proposed Rule: Combining the “Context-Sensitive” and 
“Plain-Meaning” Approach 
Combining the “context-sensitive” approach with the “plain-
meaning” approach would produce a hybrid rule to resolve the 
current circuit split.  While the plain-meaning approach is most 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent, it is overly broad and 
could lead to mandatory documents being protected by being 
potentially scandalous.  Adding a context-sensitive approach, 
however, will narrow what is considered worthy of § 107(b)(2)’s 
protection.  The teacher and former judge wishing to have 
documents made publicly inaccessible to shield themselves from 
embarrassment or humiliation will have their motions denied by 
adding the context-sensitive gloss.  The policy this rule promotes 
is that debtors that benefitted from a document being filed 
cannot retroactively seek to have documents made confidential to 
shield themselves from the possibility of shame or 
embarrassment. 
 
140 Id. at 69. Bankruptcy courts have “the power to regulate the members of its 
bar.” Id. at 68 n.4. 
141 Id. at 69. 
142 Id. 
143 490 B.R. 240, 243–44 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2013). 
144 Id. at 249. 
145 461 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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1. Why the “Plain-Meaning” Approach Is the Most Logical, But 
Overly Broad 
The Ninth Circuit’s “plain-meaning” approach to § 107 is the 
most logical approach to § 107(b)(2) and consistent with Supreme 
Court precedent.  When the Supreme Court interprets a statute 
containing clear and unambiguous language, “[t]he plain 
meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare 
cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a 
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its 
drafters.’ ”146  Further, the Supreme Court has held that allowing 
the plain meaning to control is the most logical and sensible way 
to interpret a statute.147 
Similar to the Ninth Circuit’s approach in In re Roman, the 
Supreme Court “customarily turn[s] to dictionaries for help in 
determining whether a word in a statute has a plain or common 
meaning.”148  None of the dictionary definitions of scandalous 
even hint at a truthfulness or relevancy requirement.149  
Requiring a showing of either is inappropriate, as courts must 
presume Congress “says . . . what it means and means . . . what it 
says” in a statute.150  The language used in § 107(b)(2) indicates 
Congress’s intent to have scandalous matters treated differently 
from defamatory ones. 
However, the Ninth Circuit’s “plain-meaning approach” to 
define scandalous is overly broad because it would lead to 
nondisclosure of documents that should be publicly available.  
The high school teacher in In re Creighton and the former judge 
in In re Neal could successfully argue that the information 
contained in their bankruptcy dockets are disgraceful or 
 
146 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). 
147 Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 338 (1941). 
148 Nat’l Coal. for Students with Disabilities Educ. & Legal Def. Fund v. Allen, 
152 F.3d 283, 289 (4th Cir. 1998); see Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 
176 (2009) (relying on the Oxford English Dictionary and Random House Dictionary 
of English to define “because of”); Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 
1, 11 (1931) (turning to the Century Dictionary to define “manufacture”); Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431–32 (2000) (using Webster’s New International Dictionary 
and Black’s Law Dictionary to define “fail”). 
149 See supra text accompanying note 129. 
150 Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992); see DR. SEUSS, 
HORTON HATCHES THE EGG (1940) (“I meant what I said [a]nd I said what I 
meant. . . . An elephant’s faithful [o]ne hundred per cent!”). 
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shameful.  High school students would lose respect for their 
business teacher upon learning she filed for bankruptcy, and the 
former-judge’s name and reputation would be further taininted if 
her history of accepting loans from attorneys was made public.  
Adding a context-sensitive approach to this analysis would 
ensure that commonly filed documents, such as bankruptcy 
petitions and creditor lists, are made available to the public. 
2. Narrowing the Plain-Meaning Approach with the Context-
Sensitive Approach 
If a matter is “disgraceful, offensive, shameful and the like,” 
a court must next analyze why the document was filed in the 
bankruptcy docket.151  Under this categorical approach, the more 
common the paper is to bankruptcy, the less likely it is to be 
protected by § 107(b)(2).  Under the proposed rule, there are four 
categories a paper could be classified as: (1) commonly filed 
documents that are necessary to file for bankruptcy; 
(2) documents that the Bankruptcy Code allows; (3) litigation 
documents for disputed or contested matters; and (4) documents 
filed for rare, unique, or strategic purposes.  Courts would 
scrutinize the documents based on several factors, including how 
often this type of document appears in a bankruptcy proceeding, 
whether it was necessary or mandatory to obtain a bankruptcy 
benefit, and whether the type of document is expressly provided 
for by the Code. 
Commonly filed documents, such as creditor lists, and 
documents that the Code specifically permits, such as 
investigative-reports, are less deserving of the protections of 
§ 107(b)(2).  In other words, if the document filed was one that 
the Code allows or if it was necessary to obtain a bankruptcy 
benefit, such as the bankruptcy discharge, then the document 
should be publicly available.  While necessary documents would 
virtually always be made available, court-ordered investigative 
reports would be subjected to a slightly higher level of scrutiny, 
and only compelling reasons would warrant nondisclosure.  For 
example, if the investigative report in Gitto Global Corporation 
contained allegations of employing child laborers in sweatshops, 
the report would need to be filed under seal for multiple reasons.  
 
151 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d 417, 432 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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First, those details stretch beyond the scope of § 1104(c).152  
Second, the allegations would detrimentally impact the 
corporation’s ability to do business, thus impairing its ability to 
repay debts. 
Allegations of employing child laborers in a sweatshop in the 
hypothetical investigative report would classify as litigation 
documents for disputed matters, and under the proposed rule, 
these types of documents would be generally withheld from the 
public.  Documents of this nature would be subjected to heavy 
scrutiny from a court, and matters would only be made available 
based on either a compelling reason or if the matter had 
previously been adjudicated.153  The last category—documents 
filed for rare, unique, or strategic purposes—would 
presumptively never be made publicly accessible.  The court-
ordered reflection report in Robbins v. Tripp is an example of this 
fourth category, as the lawyer’s mea culpa report regarding his 
poor practice was filed for a purpose wholly distinguishable from 
the lawyer’s debtor-client’s bankruptcy proceeding. 
D. Policy Favoring the Proposed Rule 
The proposed rule is consistent with the common-law, First 
Amendment, and with Supreme Court precedent.  Like the 
common-law and Supreme Court precedent, documents filed for 
improper purposes will be withheld from the public.154  Moreover, 
just as in First Amendment cases, courts may prevent public 
access to the record when compelling reasons exist.155 
The proposed rule’s two-step approach is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s approach to First Amendment public-access 
cases.  In accessibility issues cases under the First Amendment, 
the Supreme Court generally allows public access when 
proceedings were historically open to the public and if the 
public’s presence would further the democratic process.156  The 
proposed rule embraces these same principles, as bankruptcy 
 
152 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2012). 
153 Under the proposed rule, the hypothetical investigative report would be 
made publicly available if the corporation had filed for bankruptcy after being sued 
for hiring child laborers or if the corporation was already found guilty of employing 
child laborers. 
154 See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597–98 (1978). 
155 See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. I), 464 U.S. 501, 510 
(1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982). 
156 Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, at 71. 
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courts analyzing § 107(b)(2) would analyze whether the 
document is traditionally filed in bankruptcy cases.  Next, the 
court would see if the filing was beneficial to the debtor.  
Commonly filed documents that benefit debtors will always be 
made publicly available.  Further, just as the Supreme Court 
impedes public availability for compelling governmental 
interests,157 the proposed rule grants judges discretion to 
withhold documents from public consumption for compelling 
reasons. 
The proposed rule is also consistent with Supreme Court 
precedent, as the Court would likely take a plain-meaning 
approach to interpret § 107(b)(2).158  Bankruptcy courts operating 
under the proposed rule would still have “supervisory power over 
its own records and files” and access to documents could be 
denied when the documents will be “a vehicle for improper 
purposes.”159  Just like common-law courts, the proposed rule 
would impede public access to documents that “gratify private 
spite or promote public scandal.” 160  Documents would also be 
made inaccessible under the proposed rule if they would impair a 
business’s competitive standing.161  Giving bankruptcy judges 
broad discretion to define scandalous benefits debtors hoping to 
reorganize and payback debts, and thus also benefits creditors.  
Scandalous allegations could impair a debtor’s ability to do 
business, which would detrimentally impact creditors that are 
owed money. 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed rule attempts to resolve the circuit split, but 
much like Justice Potter Stewart’s problem with obscenity, it 
may be impossible to precisely define the term “scandalous.”  In 
Jacobellis v. Ohio,162 the United States Supreme Court held that 
 
157 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
158 See supra Part I. 
159 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598. 
160 In re Caswell, 29 A. 259, 259 (R.I. 1893) (denying access to court records 
because publishing “the painful, and sometimes disgusting, details of a divorce 
case . . . fails to serve any useful purpose . . . [and leads to] demoralization and 
corruption . . . by catering to a morbid craving for that which is sensational and 
impure”). 
161 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598; Schmedding v. May, 85 N.W. 201, 202 (Mich. 1891); 
Flexmir, Inc. v. Herman, 40 A.2d 799, 800 (N.J. Ch. 1945). 
162 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
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a motion picture containing “an explicit love scene” was not 
obscene pursuant to the Court’s precedent.163  Justice Stewart 
concurred with the majority’s opinion, but chose not to reaffirm 
the Court’s Roth obscenity test.164  Rather, Justice Stewart 
famously proclaimed he would not “attempt . . . to define 
[obscenity] . . . and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly 
doing so.  But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture 
involved in this case is not that.”165 
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit’s definition is instructive, determinations of scandalous 
will, of necessity, always be somewhat subjective.  Adding the 
“context-sensitive” categorical approach lends objectivity to the 
§ 107(b)(2) analysis, but completely banishing subjectivity is 
impossible. 
While it may be impossible to come up with an ironclad 
definition of scandalous, § 107(b) is nevertheless important.  It 
furthers the goals of judicial transparency and benefits debtors 
and creditors alike.166  The common law, First Amendment, and 
Supreme Court cases support “robust public access to court 
records,”167 and § 107 was created to protect persons and 
corporations from unwarranted publication of scandalous 
matters. 
 
163 Id. at 196. 
164 Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
165 Id. 
166 Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 42, at 98. 
167 Frank Volk, What Do Scandal and Defamation Have To Do with the Code? 
The Law Governing Sealing Orders Under 11 U.S.C. § 107, 26-Nov. AM. BANKR. 
INST. J. 12, 68 (2007). 
